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 This report, rooted in the conflict over the control of natural resource wealth, 
departs from the widely-accepted findings of two disparate literatures. First, while recent 
analyses correctly conclude that natural resources rents play a contingent role in 
development, this study deviates from the conventional wisdom attributing the variation 
of the resource curse to formal institutions. Secondly, as opposed to the recent wave of 
“political insurance” arguments that ascribe the creation of reforms to weak incumbents 
attempting to tie the hands of their successors, I argue that actors pursue similar 
institutional reforms for economic and political reasons. I build on these literatures by 
examining the commitment to a specific government institution—stabilization funds, 
which manage the fluctuations of natural resource rents and stop natural resource wealth 
from being a curse—across three natural resource-rich Latin American countries: Chile, 
Mexico and Venezuela. Paradoxically, because successful stabilization funds provide 
greater political benefits when rents are saved, I argue that these institutions only tie the 
hands of political successors from using rents for political purposes when they are created 
for economic purposes.  
 
vii





II. The Logic of Political Insurance …………………………………..………….. 3
III. Political Insurance vs. Economically-Oriented Institutional Creation ...…….. 7
IV. The Resource Curse and Resource Stabilization Funds as a Solution ……… 15
V. Resource Stabilization Funds in Venezuela and Chile……….…………….... 21
Venezuela and the Macroeconomic Stabilization Fund ..………………. 22











Under what circumstances do weak incumbents initiate reforms in order to limit 
the ability of their successors to govern in an unconstrained manner? When and in what 
circumstances do such reforms work? How does the conflict over the political control of 
natural resource wealth shape what is know as the resource curse? What explains the 
ability of some countries to not be cursed by natural resource wealth? 
This manuscript will address these questions by examining why governments 
create specific institutions—which I call resource stabilization funds—that are designed 
to help insulate countries from the wild fluctuations of natural resource prices. As will be 
explained below, while these institutions have the potential to positively impact the 
economies of natural resource-rich countries, they can also serve as mechanisms to 
constrain the use of natural resource revenues for political purposes. I pit my own 
explanation for why these institutions are created and the reasons for the success of these 
institutions against the logic of political insurance, which have recently become popular 
explanations for the creation of institutions across different issue areas of comparative 
politics. 
Political insurance arguments, in their most general form, suggest that embattled 
incumbents create certain institutions or reforms in order to tie the hands of their 
successors, such that these successors cannot govern unencumbered. The evidence from 
this manuscript suggests that these attempts to tie successor’s hands based on political 
calculations are unlikely to succeed. In contrast, I argue that reforms and institutions can 
tie the hands of successor governments, but only when they are created for positive 
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purposes. I present evidence based on field research in Venezuela and Chile, two natural 
resource-rich countries that have had contrasting experiences with the management of 
their natural resource revenues despite a similar institution—a resource stabilization fund.  
In Venezuela, I attribute the failure of this institution to the fact that its creators 
wanted to limit the availability of politically-beneficial oil revenues to incoming 
president Hugo Chávez. In Chile, I argue that the success of the resource stabilization 
fund was due to the fact that it was created for purely economic purposes, long before a 
successor government came to power. 
By focusing on countries rich in natural resources, I am also able to speak to the 
resource curse literature, which has made remarkable strides as of late. While I agree with 
the recent wave of resource curse literature suggesting that natural resource wealth is a 
contingent curse (or blessing) (Dunning 2009; Smith 2008), my argument explaining the 
variation among rentier states focuses on the management of rents as opposed to formal 
institutions, upon which much of the recent literature focuses. I argue that the conditions 
under which Chile’s stabilization fund was created—and not necessarily the institution 
itself—has helped the country escape the negative effects of natural resources. In 
contrast, as a result of the reasons for its creation, the resource stabilization fund in 
Venezuela has not been successful, leaving the country vulnerable to the symptoms of the 
resource curse. As a result, the findings of this manuscript suggest that institutional 
design is a worse predictor of institutional success than the conditions under which 
institutions are created. 
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This Master’s Report will unfold as follows. I first explain and critique the logic 
of political insurance arguments. Second, I lay out my own argument based upon this 
critique. Third, I discuss the resource curse literature and how resource stabilization funds 
can play a positive role in minimizing the curse. Fourth, I present case studies of 
Venezuela and Chile to back up my arguments. I conclude with a discussion of the 
implications of the evidence for political science scholarship. 
The Logic of Political Insurance  
Institutions often structure gains and incentives such that certain groups benefit 
while other actors lose out (Przeworski 2004). Similarly, certain reforms, especially 
economic reforms, often create different winners and losers within a country (Schamis 
1999; Hellman 1998). As a result, there is an important political component behind the 
creation of institutions and reforms.  
A wave of recent literature, rooted in the idea of political insurance, has directly 
addressed the very political nature of institutional creation and reform implementation. 
While varying between issue areas, the basic premise of these arguments is that weak and 
endangered incumbents, foreseeing that they are soon going to be kicked out of office, 
undertake reforms or create institutions in order to constrain their political opponents. 
These incumbents, who understand the political benefits of governing in an unfettered 
manner, want to constrain their successors by minimizing the ability of their rivals to 
extend their tenure by manipulating certain levers of government. In short, weak 
incumbents create institutions or reforms to tie the hands of their opponents, even if it 
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means that the incumbents temporarily tie their own hands by subjecting themselves to 
the constraints intended for their successors.  
While getting its start in the American Politics literature on bureaucratic drift 
(Moe 1991; see Boylan 2001 and Figueiredo 2002 for a review of these original 
arguments), scholars of comparative politics have frequently applied these political 
insurance arguments in diverse issue areas such as Central Bank Independence (Boylan 
2001), the endogenous restriction of natural resource revenues (Dunning 2010), as well as 
the creation of certain judicial reforms (Ginsburg 2003; Finkel 2005, 2008).  
The current wave of political insurance literature is a reaction to more 
functionalist arguments (e.g. Maxfield 1997), which removed politics from the creation 
of institutions that clearly benefitted the interests of certain domestic actors to the 
detriment of others. The application of political insurance arguments to comparative 
politics, and especially in developing and transitioning countries, was a welcome 
realization that political actors had much to gain and lose in high stakes political contests 
that were taking place under conditions of uncertainty and high fluidity. Institutions were 
not benign innovations; rather, incumbents were controlling what they could, often at the 
expense of their successors.  
Unfortunately, the intuitiveness of these political insurance arguments has largely 
meant that their often-tenuous logic has been taken for granted. There are several 
problems with these arguments. First, the timing of institutional creation does not make 
sense in much of the political insurance literature. We should expect that incumbents will 
only insulate their preferred policies at the last possible second, so they can enjoy the 
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benefits of governing unfettered as long as possible. Yet, in the empirical application of 
many political insurance arguments, incumbents undertake reforms years before their 
term is set to expire.1 However, if incumbents are worried about their political successors 
using certain tricks to increase their political standing, why would the incumbent not try 
to rebuild her own political support by employing these same tricks in the time she has 
remaining? To give up control over valuable political resources with plenty of time 
remaining in her term suggests that the ability to manipulate the levers of government is 
not so politically valuable after all; therefore she would not have to be worried about 
insuring her preferred outcomes in order to constrain the actions of her successors.  
Second, political insurance arguments often assume that institutions and policies 
created by weak incumbents will be automatically successful in tying the hands of their 
rivals; these arguments are biased toward institutional success. The recent wave of 
political insurance arguments is applied to developing countries that are often 
institutionally weak and in the midst of political and economic transitions, which often 
makes countries susceptible to uncertainty (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986). Under 
circumstances of uncertainty and fluidity, assuming that an institution will automatically 
take root and successfully tie the hands of political successors is a stretch (Levitsky and 
Murillo 2009). In a related manner, instances of political insurance are unlikely to tie the 
hands of successors since the logic of these arguments assumes that the incumbents who 
enact insurance policies are weak. New incumbents should thus face little public 
                                                 
1 For example, Dunning (2010) suggests that because the Caldera administration in Venezuela came into 
office in a position of weakness, it undertook reforms minimize the amount of oil rents flowing to the 
government almost immediately, several years before its mandate was set to expire. 
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opprobrium or audience costs if they ignore or repeal the policies of a discredited 
predecessor. As a result, we should be suspicious that successors will be truly constrained 
by the attempts of their predecessors to tie their hands. 
Finally, the definitions and measures of important variables triggering instances 
of policy insurance are often either weak or non-existent.2 For example, while a weak 
incumbent is required under the logic of political insurance, some authors have not 
developed clear variables or measures for their readers to indicate when an incumbent is 
truly weak (Finkel 2005; Ginsburg 2003). Such an omission makes falsification difficult 
and relies on post hoc justification (e.g. an incumbent was weak because political 
insurance occurred). Moreover, while Dunning (2010) does develop a measure for 
executive weakness, his measure is static and based entirely on the conditions under 
which incumbents are elected, neglecting the fact that the political standing of 
incumbents can vacillate wildly during a tenure.3 Furthermore, it is not only the weak 
political standing of the incumbents that is responsible for instances of political 
insurance: the nature of the opposition also matters. Without a clear threat from a 
political rival, there are no hands to tie. Among the recent examples of political insurance 
arguments, only Boylan (2001) incorporates the opposition. However, her variable is 
based upon differences of political ideology between the incumbent and the opposition, 
                                                 
2 Boylan (2001), who took great pains to suggest that political insurance occurs under conditions of a threat 
which is both intense and imminent, is a rare exception to this criticism. Yet even her typology focuses 
more on the nature of the opposition than the nature of the incumbents themselves. 
3 The case of Michelle Bachelet in Chile is instructive regarding the ever-changing political fortunes of 
incumbents. After winning a majority after the second round of the 2006 election, her approval rating 
plunged because of the controversial changes to the Santiago Transportation System, only to dramatically 
rebound by the time she left office. Source: Centro de Estudios Públicos: Estudio Nacional de Opinión 
Pública N 55, Junio 2007 and Estudio Nacional de Opinión Pública N 61, Octubre 2009, 




neglecting the fact that political rivals need not have vastly different ideological 
platforms in order for each to be concerned about the other reaping the political benefits 
of holding the reins of government.4 As a result, in order to identify actual cases of 
political insurance, we require indicators of greater precision regarding the political 
standing of incumbents and the strength of the opposition. 
Based on the above criticisms, I argue that we should be suspicious of some—but 
certainly not all—instances of political insurance. Furthermore, even in the rare cases of 
political insurance, we should be equally skeptical that these institutions will successfully 
constrain successors. Under what conditions does political insurance occur?  Moreover, 
when do reforms actually tie the hands of political successors? I develop an argument to 
address these questions in the section that follows. 
Political Insurance vs. Economically-Oriented Institutional Creation 
In contrast to the logic of the political insurance literature which suggests that 
politically-motivated institutions successfully constrain political rivals, I argue that 
institutions and reforms only tie the hands of successors when they are created for 
economic, and not political, purposes.5   
I agree with de Figueiredo’s (2002) assessment that instances of political 
insulation are quite rare. As a result, it is essential to establish the conditions under which 
political insurance occurs, which has been taken for granted in some of the recent 
political insurance literature (e.g. Ginsburg 2003; Finkel 2005).  
                                                 
4 An example here is the two main political parties of Venezuela until the 1990s, AD and COPEI, who were 
very competitive with one another despite similar policies. The perquisite of being in office was an 
opportunity to control oil revenues and to enjoy its spoils, not to enact certain ideologically-oriented 
policies. 
5 I use the terms “reforms” and “institutions” interchangeably in this section.  
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Following the criticisms of political insurance arguments above, I argue that a 
first condition of political insurance is that an incumbent is at the end of her tenure. If an 
election is not immanent, an incumbent can still improve her political standing. Under the 
logic of political insurance arguments, an incumbent constrains herself in order to tie the 
hands of successors. Yet if there is still ample time left for an incumbent to regain her 
political luster, it would not make sense for the incumbent to tie her own hands and 
jeopardize her chances of resurgence. Thus, it is only logical that political insurance 
happens only when there is very little time remaining in an incumbent’s term. 
Similarly, a second condition for cases of political insurance is that the incumbent 
be unelectable and/or completely discredited. Along with being at the end of her 
mandate, an incumbent would only tie her own hands and give up the advantages of 
governing in an unfettered manner when there is no chance that she, or her political 
affiliates, can remain in power. For political insurance to make sense, an incumbent needs 
to be in a position whereby she cannot extend her tenure by exploiting the benefits she 
wants to deny her successor, which will only occur when the incumbent has no chance of 
maintaining power. 
In addition to a very weak incumbent at the end of her term, considerations of 
political insurance must also include the opposition. Specifically, the threat emanating 
from the opposition needs to be strong and coherent. While Boylan’s (2001) framework 
for political insurance correctly includes the proximity of the oppositional threat, it is also 
necessary to consider the viability and strength of the incumbent’s political rivals. Even 
when elections are looming, a weak opposition consisting of several disparate factions 
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does not represent nearly the threat that a single challenger with popular support does. 
Without a clear threat from a strong and unified opposition, the embattled incumbent 
might be able to overcome her weakness and remain in office. In short, for political 
insurance to work, an incumbent needs someone’s hands to tie. 
Finally, institutions or reforms created for the purposes of political insurance 
should include specific provisions aimed at constraining the executive. Since the whole 
point of an incumbent insulating her preferred policies is tying the hands of her 
successors, the text of the reform or rules of the institution should clearly attempt to 
minimize executive discretion. 
While these conditions help to identify cases of political insurance, left 
unanswered is whether attempts to tie successor’s hands will be successful. I argue that 
the seeds of an institution’s demise are sewn when they are created for purposes of 
political insurance; that is, we should not expect reforms to work when their creation 
corresponds to the above conditions.  
The fact that actual cases of political insurance are undertaken by a very weak 
incumbent with precious little time left in her term has important implications for the 
functionality of the institution. First, since actual instances of political insurance occur 
just before government turnover, the institutions created do not provide any benefits to 
the successor government. While most instances of political insulation involve the 
creation of a reform that seems benign on paper (e.g. a resource stabilization fund can 
bring macroeconomic stability and minimize an economy’s vulnerability to wild 
fluctuations of natural resource prices), the positive benefits of these institutions often 
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accrue over the medium or long term, thereby denying the successor the short term 
benefits enjoyed by the former incumbent. As a result, it is often in the interests of the 
successor to ignore or change the previous incumbent’s reform so she can enjoy the 
political benefits of governing in an unconstrained manner. 
Similarly, since institutions structure benefits such that there are winners and 
losers, newly-created institutions and reforms can provide new benefits to or can 
empower new individuals or groups.6  However, when institutions are created under the 
conditions of political insurance, these nascent reforms are unlikely to have started 
providing benefits to these other actors, thereby removing a potential veto point to an 
executive stripping back the reforms (Tsebelis 1995).   
Third, the conditions under which instances of political insurance occur also 
facilitate the successor in being able to ignore or change the previous incumbent’s 
reforms. Since an incumbent will only insulate her preferred policies when she is 
unelectable and discredited, the reforms she enacts should have limited credibility in the 
eyes of the electorate. As a result, it should be relatively easy for the successor to repeal 
or ignore the institution, since the audience costs will be minimal.  
For all of these reasons, political insurance is unlikely to tie the hands of 
successors, contrary to the assumptions of much of the extant political insurance 
literature. In contrast, I argue that reforms undertaken for positive purposes have a much 
better opportunity to survive and to constrain political successors. Yet we must first 
discuss how we can differentiate instances of positively-motivated reforms from those 
                                                 
6 For example, the creation of a resource stabilization fund can help to stabilize the exchange rate (Balassa 
1988), making exporting more viable and increasing the economic and political clout of this group. 
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created for political purposes before commencing a discussion of why such reforms have 
a greater potential for success.  
First, reforms that have positive aims are likely to be undertaken when problems 
of the current system are exposed and, as a result, demands for broad-based change are 
articulated. This reduces the barriers to implementing reforms aimed at positive change 
for two reasons. On the one hand, such a crisis can often marginalize the actors with 
entrenched interests in maintaining the current system, who typically fight to protect their 
specific benefits (Pierson 1994). On the other hand, the public might see themselves in 
the domain of losses during these times of economic duress (Weyland 2002), making 
them more inclined to accept reforms. 
Second, I argue that institutions created for positive purposes will be created in 
close proximity to and alongside other complementary reforms. Since the previous 
condition suggested that positive-minded reform occurs once problems with the existing 
system rear their head, a one-off reform will likely have little impact on deep seated and 
complex problems. Instead, when institutions are created for positive purposes, we are 
likely to see a package of complementary reforms aimed at achieving broad goals (e.g. 
macroeconomic stability) as opposed to a narrow goal (e.g. saving natural resource 
revenues for a rainy day). 
Third, the timing of creation is also important. Opposite the logic of politically-
motivated institutional creation where incumbents enact reforms at the last second, 
incumbents enact reforms for positive ends while there is still plenty time remaining in 
their mandate. Reforms that attempt to achieve positive goals do not often bear fruit in 
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the short term; in fact, many economic reforms impose short term costs while the benefits 
only accrue in the medium-to-long term. As a result, the incumbent would want to be in a 
position to enjoy these medium-term benefits, and would only enact such reforms if there 
was still sufficient time in her term to reap these benefits. 
These conditions under which economically-oriented reforms take place 
contribute to the ability of these reforms to successfully tie the hands of successors. First 
of all, the institutions themselves have a greater opportunity to develop institutional 
strength if they are not created immediately before government turnover (Levitsky and 
Murillo 2009). When an institution is functioning regularly for a period between its 
creation and government turnover, the institution itself might become more resistant to 
change. Over time, the institution becomes more regularized and process-oriented 
allowing it to take on a life of its own, making adherence to its rules something of a 
procedural norm (Barnett and Finnemore 2005).  
Second, respecting the institution can be beneficial to new governments after 
transitions, as it sends positive economic signals aimed to foreign investors who might be 
hesitant to invest when a new and unknown government comes to power—especially in 
times of uncertainty (Maxfield 1997). Furthermore, it assuages foreign investors who 
have already investments in the country, making capital flight less likely. Not only can 
adhering to the institution thus provide a government with greater income from taxation, 
but these foreign investors can also act as something of a veto point, making it more 
difficult for a government to dramatically change course if they wanted. 
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Third, and in a similar manner, economically-oriented reforms often create new 
domestic actors with a vested interest in the maintenance of the system, who can also act 
as a veto point against institutional change. While the crisis to which the reforms 
responded decimated the power of those with vested interests in the previous system, 
actors with vested interests in the new system will rise and become more empowered the 
longer the new institution functions, making it politically difficult to scale back the 
predecessor’s reforms. 
While this combination of actors with interests in maintaining the institution 
makes scaling back the reforms more difficult, the conditions of economically-oriented 
institutional creation also provide direct benefits to the successor government itself. First 
of all, there are political benefits to be had for maintaining economic stability, especially 
in countries where wild economic fluctuations made economic instability the norm 
(Engel and Meller 1993; see Ocampo 2005 for a broad view of the importance of 
macroeconomic stability). Jobs are often more plentiful and stable, spending on public 
sector projects and social benefits is more consistent, and investments are generally less 
risky. The greater economic stability the successor government can provide, the greater 
are its chances of reelection. The potential to increase political standing via adherence to 
economic reforms means that there are fewer incentives for the government itself to 
break institutional rules for short term benefits. 
This combination of external and internal utility minimizes the opportunities to 
defect and diminishes the benefits from reneging on the reforms enacted by the previous 
incumbent. The result is that the successor is constrained from breaking the institutional 
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rules for short term gain. This leads to the paradoxical conclusion that institutions can 
only tie the hands of successors when the initial reason for enacting that institution was 
not for constraining rivals, but rather for positive, economic reasons. When created for 
political purposes, successors have few incentives to abide by the previous incumbent’s 
reforms and generally have little difficulty ignoring or changing these reforms. As a 
result, the successor gets to enjoy the political benefits from which their predecessor 
sought to limit access. When created for positive purposes, however, successors actually 
gain more from abiding by the institution than from the political benefits gained through 
ignoring or changing the institution. Political insurance is only possible where it was not 
intended. 
Because successful cases of political insurance depend upon the conditions under 
which reforms were created, the “parchment rules” (Carey 2000) of the institution are 
often of little consequence. This argument suggests, as the evidence below bears out, that 
a formal institution that is very strong on paper will actually be less successful than a 
weak formal institution when the former is created for political purposes and the latter is 
created for positive purposes. This mirrors the conclusions reached by Levitsky and 
Murillo (2009) that institutional strength should not simply be though of as a function of 
the formal characteristics of institutions. 
I apply this distinction between politically- and economically-motivated reforms 
to natural resource-rich countries. Historically, countries that are awash in natural 
resources typically exhibit suboptimal economic performance, which I argue is due to the 
poor management of natural resource rents. A main hurdle to the proper management of 
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natural resource revenues is that the often-massive flow of rents provides incumbents 
with a source of political advantage over rivals, which often leads incumbents to 
wantonly spend these riches. An incumbent, facing electoral defeat, might want to deny 
her successors access to these politically-valuable rents. However, it is precisely this 
pattern of reckless spending that creates the economic imbalances, which a reform-
minded incumbent might seek to alter. As a result, there are both economic and political 
reasons to constrain the amount of rents available for current spending. In what follows, I 
first examine what scholars call the resource curse and then a main institutional avenue 
through which countries attempt to minimize the effects of this curse. 
The Resource Curse and Resource Stabilization Funds as a Solution 
The literature on the natural resource curse, the rentier state, and Dutch Disease7 
has recently made remarkable strides by relying on more nuanced and contingent 
explanations to understand the relationship that natural resource wealth plays in political 
and economic development (or lack thereof). 
The original strand of resource curse literature sought to link natural resource 
wealth to state weakness, mainly in the Middle East and developing countries (Mahdavy 
1970: Beblawi 1990; Gelb and Associates 1988; see especially Ross 1999 for a 
comprehensive review of this literature).This attempt to attribute suboptimal outcomes to 
the abundance of rents flowing to the state was a reaction to the sanguine arguments of 
the 1950s, which suggested that developing countries rich in natural resources were at an 
                                                 
7 While all three of these traditions have their own logic, I lump them together as they represent the main 




advantage vis-à-vis their natural resource-poor peers (Viner 1952; North 1955). The 
resulting conclusion was the existence of a “paradox of plenty”: instead of helping 
countries develop, natural resource wealth produced authoritarian governments, decayed 
state institutions, and weak economic growth (Karl 1997). 
In the 1990s and early 2000s, scholars, aided by more robust statistical 
techniques, seemed to deepen the links between rents and suboptimal economic and 
political outcomes (Sachs and Werner 1995, 1997; Ross 2001). Nevertheless, the blanket 
statement that natural resource wealth automatically yielded economic and political 
instability chafed against empirical realities (Robinson et al. 2006): countries with stable 
economies such as Chile and Botswana received large rents from copper and diamonds, 
respectively, while scholars traced democracy in Venezuela to the presence of oil wealth 
(Karl 1987; Dunning 2008).  
Reacting to this disconnect, scholars have recently moved toward the conclusion 
that natural resources play a contingent role in political and economic development; that 
is, while natural resources certainly have the potential to produce suboptimal outcomes, 
rents alone are not a determinant of durable authoritarianism and economic 
underachievement (Dunning 2009; Smith 2008; Kurtz 2009). A recurring theme of this 
second wave of resource curse literature is that the contingent nature of rents depends on 
institutions. A main debate of these arguments is whether private or public institutions—
very generally defined—account for the ability of some countries to escape the symptoms 
of the resource curse (Kolstad 2007; Mehlum et al 2006). Yet, these recent studies are 
biased toward looking at formal institutions instead of the underlying reasons accounting 
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for institutional strength or weakness (Levitsky and Murillo 2009) that condition the 
success or failure of these institutions. 
  This recent wave of arguments suggesting that the resource curse is contingent 
chafes against several recent studies that suggest the causal effect played by natural 
resource wealth is overblown (Haber and Menaldo 2008; Herb 2005; Hertog 2010). 
Nevertheless, I follow Gelb and Associates (1988) and argue that natural resource-rich 
countries do indeed face unique challenges that their resource-poor counterparts do not.8 
The main problem faced by countries that receive large amounts of rents is the variability 
of this income source, which can inhibit long-term growth. For example, in 2008, oil 
prices climbed to a high of $145/barrel in July only to drop precipitously to $34/barrel 6 
months later. For a country like Venezuela, a $1 increase (decrease) in the price per 
barrel of oil can increase (decrease) government revenue by almost $86 million in a 
single month.9 This potential for wild price fluctuations of a country’s main export, and 
the corresponding effect on public finances, exposes the economy to extreme 
vulnerability. While resource booms leave natural resource-exporting countries flush with 
cash, resource busts result in the need to dramatically cut social spending and halt public 
works projects that are in progress, which elicits further destabilizing economic effects 
(Engel and Meller 1993): Hausmann et al. (1993) suggest that these negative shocks 
prove very difficult from which to bounce back while North et al. (2009) argue that 
                                                 
8 My discussion of the challenges faced by natural resource-rich countries revolves around the economic 
side of the resource curse, which is often referred to as the economic resource curse. I am agnostic as to 
whether natural resource wealth has an effect on regime outcomes, and the remainder of this manuscript 
will not address this “political resource curse.”  
9 Authors calculations using BP’s Statistical Review of World Energy 2010, accessed October 16, 2010. 
This vulnerability holds for exporters of other natural resources as well: a $0.01 increase in the price of 
copper yields the Chilean government an additional $120 million in annual revenue (Ruiz-Dana 2007). 
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counties subject to highly volatile growth rates remain relegated to weaker and less 
productive social orders.  
I argue that the observed variation of the economic resource curse if a function of 
the (in)ability to manage natural resource revenues. I thus agree with the recent wave of 
resource curse literature suggesting that natural resource wealth is a contingent curse, but 
instead of focusing on the role of formal institutions, I center my explanation in the ways 
in which countries manage their rents: countries that can shield themselves from the 
instability of resource prices will be economically better off than those that cannot.  
Resource Stabilization Funds 
The principal means by which countries can minimize their vulnerability to 
resource busts is through special government institutions called Resource Stabilization 
Funds (RSFs). RSFs attempt to rectify the failure of countries to save resource income 
during the boom years by channeling revenues into an account separate from the fiscal 
budget, which provides revenues the government can draw upon when resource prices 
fall (Davis et al., 2003).10   
Generally, RSFs have rules that set a reference price for the natural resource. 
When the actual price of the resource matches the reference price, no deposits are made 
into the RSF. However, when actual prices are above the reference price, a percentage of 
the excess revenues are deposited in the fund, not to be used as current spending by the 
                                                 
10 Davis et al. (2003) note that these funds can take three different forms: Stabilization Funds, Savings 
Funds, and Financing Funds. While there are differences in the specific details between each type, 
following Humphreys and Sandbu (2007), I do not differentiate between the three since the underlying 
goal—removing excess rents from a country’s current budget—is largely the same for each type of fund. 
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government. When resource prices are lower than the base price, the country can draw on 
the revenues from the RSF in order to cover the shortfall.11 
There are many economic benefits of RSFs. First, resource-rich countries often 
spend beyond their means during boom times, as many leaders believe resource prices 
will stay high long into the future (Mitra 1994). Inevitably, resource prices tumble, 
sending the economy into a downward spiral and compromising future growth. RSFs 
combat this problem on two fronts. On the one hand, since only a fraction of the resource 
revenues enters the budget, governments must plan their expenditures as if they were not 
in a resource boom, minimizing over-spending. On the other hand, RSF holdings increase 
during boom times, which can later be used to smooth out shortages of government 
income during busts, yielding financial consistency. 
Furthermore, a well-managed RSF can produce broader macroeconomic stability 
for a country. Dutch Disease, a plague often associated with resource-rich economies, 
spawns from the fact that non-resource-related economic activity is rendered less 
profitable and tends to atrophy while the natural resource sector become more and more 
the center of economic activity (Humphreys, Sachs, and Stiglitz 2007; Collier 2007). 
Further compounding this problem is that resource-based economies are often subject to 
high exchange rates, which makes the non-resource export industry less viable (Balassa 
1988). As export diversity wanes, natural resource dependence increases, along with 
vulnerability to negative shocks. Yet the creation of a RSF can solve these problems. 
Since excess revenues do not enter the budget, a successful RSF will force a government 
                                                 
11 For more detailed information, see Basch and Engel (1993) for an example of the deposit and withdrawal 
rules as applied to the Chilean Copper Stabilization Fund. 
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to invest less in its own economy, maintaining the stability of exchange rates, thereby 
increasing the potential profitability of non-resource-based economic sectors. As these 
newly empowered economic actors gain economic clout, they can transform their 
economic prowess into political power (Moravcsik 1997), making it more difficult for the 
government to reverse course on its commitment to control the spending of rents. 
Removing excess rents from the budget and into a RSF allows countries to 
become less reliant on resource rents, which should foster countercyclical fiscal policy 
and minimize the negative impact of resource price busts (Engel and Valdés 2000). In 
short, these funds act as an insurance policy against the uncertainties and dangers of 
relying heavily on an unpredictable source of income. 
Yet while RSFs may seem quite benign, they do reduce the amount of rents that 
the government can use for current spending. Since natural resource revenues are often 
fungible with political power, incumbents who control natural resources revenues can be 
in a position to extend their tenure (Fearon and Laitin 2003). A successful RSF 
minimizes the discretion that an executive has over the use of natural resource rents. An 
embattled incumbent, whose tenure is at its end, might wish to deny her successor 
unfettered access to politically-valuable rents by creating a RSF. Thus, while RSFs can 
play a positive economic role, they can serve political ends as well. These diverging 
political and economic motivations for RSF creation provide an opportunity to test the 
argument advanced above. 
What follows is an analysis of two Latin American countries rich in natural 
resources—Chile and Venezuela—that have had dramatically different experiences with 
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their RSFs. In Venezuela, I argue that the RSF was created for political purposes, which, 
in accordance with my argument, has resulted in a weak RSF despite its strong rules. 
Conversely, the Chilean RSF was created for positive economic purposes, resulting in a 
strong RSF that tied the hands of successor governments despite its weak rules and 
minimized the country’s vulnerability to the resource curse. 
Resource Stabilization Funds in Venezuela and Chile 
I apply my argument for the differences in outcomes due to politically-motivated 
and positively-motivated institutional creation to Venezuela and Chile. Both countries are 
rich in valuable natural resources, oil for Venezuela and copper for Chile; resources that 
are equally susceptible price fluctuations.12 While oil has recently been more important to 
the economy of Venezuela than copper has been for Chile, it was not until copper prices 
fell during the oil booms of the 1970s (which coincided with a drop in copper prices) that 
this difference became noteworthy. In 1970 for example, 91% of Venezuela’s 
merchandise exports came from oil while over 88% of Chile’s merchandise exports were 
from copper.13 In each country, rents flow directly to the central government, as a state 
enterprise—PDVSA in Venezuela and CODELCO in Chile—are responsible for the bulk 
of resource extraction and sales.  
The data in these case studies are primarily derived from field research in each 
country, which consisted of in-depth and open-ended interviews with important economic 
policymakers as well as examinations of primary and secondary documentation. The 
                                                 
12 According to United Nations UNCTAD data, the correlation between the monthly price of oil/barrel and 
copper/lb. between 1980 and 2010 is .84. Furthermore, between 1980 and 2009, copper had a greater Price 
Instability Index than oil. Source: http://unctadstat.unctad.org/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx, last 
accessed November 19, 2010.  
13 Source: World Bank World Development Indicators Online, last accessed November 1, 2010. 
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upshot of these case studies is that while the oil stabilization fund of Venezuela has 
largely failed to control spending of natural resource revenues leaving Venezuela mired 
in the grip of the resource curse, in Chile, by contrast, the copper stabilization fund has 
succeeded admirably in reducing spending of copper rents and minimizing its 
vulnerability to negative price shocks. I attribute this divergence not to the RSFs 
themselves, but rather to the diverging conditions under which each country created its 
RSF. 
Venezuela and the Macroeconomic Stabilization Fund 
 I argue that the creation of the Venezuelan Macroeconomic Stabilization Fund14 
(MSF) is a clear example of political insurance, adhering very closely to the argument 
specified above for identifying instances of political insulation. As will be discussed in 
detail below, this institution did not tie the hands of Hugo Chávez, the Venezuelan 
President who assumed office a month after the creation of the MSF, nor did it have a 
positive economic impact on Venezuela’s economy. Instead, Chávez easily changed the 
rules of the fund multiple times, giving him ever greater discretion over the use of oil 
rents. 
 Ever since the oil booms and busts starting in the 1970s it has been well known 
within Venezuela that the economy was heavily dependent upon volatile oil revenues, 
which engendered broader macroeconomic stability (Maza Zavala 1994). Nevertheless, 
until the creation of the MSF in 1998, it proved too difficult to reform Venezuelan public 
                                                 
14 While I refer to the Venezuelan oil stabilization fund as the Macroeconomic Stabilization Fund, the 
original stabilization fund created in 1998 was called the Fondo de Inversión para la Estabilización 
Macroeconómica, which was replaced with the Fondo de Estabilización Macroeconómica in 2003. 
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finances in a way that reduced the country’s dependence on oil. In fact, previous attempts 
at economic reforms, initiated in times of low oil prices, were scuttled when oil prices 
rose; reform and austerity were able to be avoided when increasing oil rents provided an 
opportunity to delay change (Nóbrega 1995; Nóbrega and Ortega 1996; Weyland 2002). 
For example, the ambitious economic reform plan known as the Gran Viraje, or Great 
Turnaround, initiated during the second presidency of Carlos Andrés Pérez in 1989, had 
an oil stabilization fund as part of the desired battery of reforms (CORDIPLAN 1989). 
However, even though internal economic planning documents stipulated that an oil 
stabilization fund would be operational in 1992 (CORDIPLAN 1990), the fund was never 
created as the boom in oil prices in late 1990 led the government to scale back its reforms 
(Nóbrega and Ortega 1996). Thus, even though policymakers knew Venezuela’s oil 
dependence yielded economic instability (Hausmann et al. 1993), the optimal solution, a 
RSF, proved too difficult to create at this juncture.  
Yet several years later, Venezuela would finally create a RSF. This begs the 
question of what had fundamentally changed in Venezuela in order to facilitate the 
creation of the MSF. Given the previous failed attempt to create an oil stabilization fund 
and the history of bailouts stemming from injections of oil rents during booms—where 
rents temporarily gave incumbents a new lease on their political life—I argue that 
conditions under which the MSF was created are conspicuously political. 
The administration of Rafael Caldera, much like his predecessor Pérez, initiated a 
round of economic reforms, called the Agenda Venezuela, or Venezuelan Agenda, that 
were eventually scaled back during the oil boom of 1996-1997. During this period, it was 
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the Venezuelan Central Bank and not the executive branch that made progress on an oil 
stabilization fund law (author interview with Luis Rivero). As the price of oil was high, 
there seemed to be little interest from within the Caldera government to reform public 
finances in a way that minimized the role of rents. For example, Teodoro Petkoff, the 
Economic Planning Ministers during the Caldera government, did not recall a conference 
in 1997 hosted by the Venezuelan Central Bank in Caracas that brought in renowned 
international and domestic experts to discuss the issues surrounding the creation of an oil 
stabilization fund in Venezuela (author interview with Teodoro Petkoff). 
 While the Central Bank was working through 13 different variations of an oil 
stabilization fund law (Rivero 2001), the Caldera administration was limping toward the 
end of its mandate with little popular support. While the hegemony of Venezuela’s once 
strong two-party system began to erode as early as 1989, the writing was on the wall 
pronounced the traditional parties—AD and COPEI—all but dead in 1998. Political 
outsiders rejecting the labels of these traditional parties led in the polls in the lead-up to 
the 1998 presidential election. Moreover, no one affiliated with the Caldera government 
was a serious contender in these elections as the lone constant of pre-election polls was 
the inability of the traditional parties to attract support. In December 1997, a former 
beauty queen was leading, but her standing in the polls slipped throughout 1998. Yet, as 
1998 unfolded a clear threat from the opposition presented itself: “Taking over the lead, 
[Hugo] Chávez began his dramatic ascent, registering 30 percent in polls taken in May 
and reaching 39 percent by August 1998” (McCoy 1999: 66). The “dramatic rise” of 
Chávez “made many people nervous” because of his status as a political outsider and the 
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populist rhetoric he was espousing (McCoy 1999: 67). After being off the radar screen of 
the Caldera administration for many years, the MSF law became a national priority as the 
December 1998 election date neared and the threat from the opposition became clearer. 
 After wide congressional approval, the “long-awaited” stabilization fund was 
finally passed into law on November 4, 1998, a mere month before the presidential 
elections would bring populist outsider Hugo Chávez to power. Chávez won the election 
in a landslide, where he garnered the highest percentage of the vote in Venezuela’s 
democratic history. The timing of MSF creation was such that the outgoing Caldera 
administration was not going to even be in power when the law took effect. Thus, the 
Caldera administration was able to write the rules of the stabilization fund that his 
successor would (theoretically) be responsible for following. 
 The MSF law, passed just before the election, placed constraints on the newly-
elected president, further lending support to the argument that the 1998 MSF law was a 
form of political insurance for the outgoing Caldera administration. A previous draft of 
the oil stabilization fund law released more than 21 months before the 1998 election—
before a clear threat from the opposition took shape—suffered from “grave design flaws” 
by providing too much discretion to the executive (Gomes Lozano 1997: 9). These 
“flaws” were rectified in the final version of the law, which eliminated a source of 
potential executive manipulation of the oil stabilization fund. While the final design was 
perhaps more rational, it succeeded in removing a possible pathway to executive 
interference that was deemed appropriate less than 2 years prior. 
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 While the reform did place constraints on the executive, notably absent were 
complementary reforms aimed at shielding the economy from the vulnerability of oil, 
making economic policies more countercyclical, or increasing the viability of the non-oil 
export sector. No other policies or laws aimed at altering the state’s fiscal relationship 
with oil rents were being considered or were in the legislative process at the time when 
the MSF was created (author interview with Teodoro Petkoff). In short, the MSF was a 
one-off reform. 
 We can thus see that the Venezuelan creation of the MSF closely followed the 
indicators for political insurance stipulated above. Not only was the reform undertaken by 
an executive whose political allies had no chance of winning the 1998 election, but the 
creation of the stabilization fund occurred mere weeks before the next president was set 
to be elected. Pre-election polls strongly suggested that Hugo Chávez was sure to be 
elected president, constituting a viable oppositional threat. Moreover, this reform 
imposed greater restrictions on executive discretion over the use of rents and the 
management of the MSF. Finally, far from being part of a broader package of 
countercyclical economic reforms aimed at rationalizing public finances or minimizing 
Venezuela’s dependence on natural resources,15 the MSF was a one-off reform.  
I argue that it was the political nature of MSF creation that led to a very weak 
stabilization fund. From the start, the MSF was subject to political manipulation and 
failed to tie the hands of Hugo Chávez. Upon assuming office, Hugo Chávez changed the 
                                                 
15 Interestingly, counter to the experience of Chile where policymakers believed the copper stabilization 
fund achieved multiple economic goals over the medium- and long-term, former Venezuelan Economic 
Planning Minister Teodoro Petkoff rejected the idea that an oil stabilization had any purpose beyond 
providing a buffer against the short term fluctuations of oil prices (author interviews with Manuel Marfán 
and Teodoro Petkoff).  
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MSF law as “one of his first economic decisions” (Analítica Mensual 1999). Although 
the creators did believe the new institution would be successful in achieving its goals 
(author interviews with Martiza Izaguirre, Teodoro Petkoff, and Luis Rivero), there is 
good reason to believe that the MSF was dead on arrival, undermined by the conditions 
under which it was created. 
 Chávez came to power just as oil prices started an upward march, leaving a large 
potential stock of rents at his disposal. While this increased the gains to be had from 
scaling back or ignoring the MSF, the fund itself did not provide any incentives for 
Chávez to adhere to the rules. First of all, Chávez’s dismantling of the stabilization fund 
was facilitated by the fact that it was not created in tandem with other complementary 
reforms. Since the MSF was not a load bearing pillar of a broader set of economic 
policies, the parameters of the stabilization fund could be manipulated without the rest of 
the economic system collapsing. 
 Secondly, the timing of MSF creation and the fact that the stabilization fund was 
not created alongside reforms intended to increase the viability of the non-oil export 
sector facilitated Chávez’s ability to easily weaken the rules of the stabilization fund. One 
the one hand, because the institution had only been created mere months before its rules 
were changed, non-oil exporters had yet to benefit from the stabilization fund’s potential 
ability to control the exchange rate and make the price of  their goods more competitive 
in foreign markets. On the other hand, because the MSF was a one-off reform, there were 
no complementary reforms that provided incentives to non-oil exporters, such as 
subsidies. In short, there were no external barriers to institutional change since potential 
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stakeholders of the reform had not yet benefitted from the institution and were thus in no 
position to apply political pressure to protect their benefits. 
 An analysis of the changes to the MSF institutional rules allowed Chávez greater 
executive discretion over the management of the fund; that is, the rules of the fund 
became weaker, giving Chávez more direct control over the depository of oil rents.16 The 
first change to the rules of the fund stipulated that 40% of any withdrawal from the MSF 
be directed toward Chávez’s recently-created, Fondo Único Social, or Single Social 
Fund. The Fondo Único Social, created in 1999, was “an institution run by the military 
that disbursed billions of dollars of oil monies” for social development projects (Edwards 
2010: 197). This change led Chávez to enjoy much greater current spending of oil 
revenues. For example, in the 2000 budget, of the 241 billion Bolívares allotted to the 
FUS, more than 230 billion came from the MSF, which would not have been possible 
without his change to the MSF law.17 
 Chávez would go on to change the original MSF four more times in the ensuing 
four years, with a common thread being the “delay” of deposits into the fund. The change 
to the MSF rules in 2002 said there would be no deposits during 2003. This came on the 
heels of the change in October 2001, stipulating there would be no deposits into the fund 
in the final quarter of 2001 or during all of 2002. Furthermore the change to the rules in 
2001 lowered the percentage of oil revenues directed toward the fund, from 50% of all oil 
                                                 
16 For example, an article was added giving the executive a 5-year window for discretionary withdrawals of 
MSF revenues. These withdrawals needed little more than the consent of the Finance Committee of the 
Chamber of Deputies. 
17 Source: Ley de Presupuesto para el Ejercicio Fiscal 2000, 
http://201.249.236.149:7777/onapre/Ley_2000/Ley_de_Presupuesto_2000.pdf, accessed Oct 27, 2010.  
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earnings down to 6%.18 Finally, the January 2003 change to the MSF removed—for 5 
years—the article of the original law stipulating that a maximum of 2/3 of the fund’s total 
revenue could be withdrawn annually, allowing unlimited spending from the fund. The 
cumulative effect of these changes was that Chávez would enjoy more oil revenues for 
current spending while having greater discretion over the use of these rents. 
 Beyond the weakening of the MSF caused by Chávez’s numerous law changes, 
there is also evidence that Chávez and the Central Bank did not comply with the 
institutional rules of the MSF law. For example, the once-autonomous congressional 
economic oversight committee noted that there were irregularities with the deposits to the 
fund between the final financial quarter of 2000 to the third quarter of 2001 (Oficina de 
Asesoría Económica y Financiera 2002b). Furthermore this same oversight committee 
noted that the Venezuelan Central Bank’s approvals of Chávez’s request for funds from 
the MSF were “illegal” (Oficina de Asesoría Económica y Financiera 2002a: 17). 
 Because the law was created by a discredited executive whose political allies were 
swept from power, there was no one holding Chávez’s feet to the fire with regard to the 
stabilization fund. Moreover, the fact that Chávez won the election by the largest margin 
in Venezuela’s democratic history meant that he had a mandate that was difficult for the 
opposition to counter. In short, just as the MSF provided no incentives for Chávez to 
adhere to the original rules, neither did the opposition have the ability to enforce 
Chávez’s compliance with the institution. 
                                                 




 Not surprisingly, the creators of the institution now see the MSF as a failure 
(author interviews with Maritza Izaguirre and Teodoro Petkoff), and a senior Venezuelan 
Central Bank advisor says that, though still on the books, the MSF “doesn’t exist 
anymore.” In the decade between Chávez’s initial election and the height of the oil boom 
in 2008, the MSF did not help Venezuela reduce its dependence on oil rents nor did it 
spur non-oil exports. In fact, the percentage of total exports from oil increased 
dramatically while the non-oil exports decreased.19 This had the effect of making the 
Venezuelan economy much more dependent on oil rents, thereby deepening its 
susceptibility to the symptoms of the resource curse. 
 In the end, the attempt to tie the hands of Hugo Chávez failed and the status quo 
in Venezuela prevailed. The Venezuelan economy’s dependence on rents was maintained 
(if not deepened) while Chávez was able to do what every Venezuelan President had 
done since the 1970s: he spent the vast sums of oil wealth as they poured in, saving none 
for a rainy day. The net result is that Venezuela’s economy is still largely cursed by oil, 
despite a formal institution intended as a cure. The Venezuelan case demonstrates the 
difficulty that political insurance arguments face: principally that the conditions under 
which attempts to tie successors’ hands occur allow these successors to ignore or change 
the constraints placed upon them. 
Chile and the Copper Stabilization Fund 
I argue first, in contrast to Venezuela, that the Chilean Copper Stabilization Fund 
(CSF) was created for positive purposes, and second, that the conditions under which the 
                                                 
19 Source: World Bank World Development Indicators Online, accessed November 3, 2010.  
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CSF was created allowed the institution to tie the hands of successor governments from 
using copper revenues for political purposes. As a result, Chile is now less susceptible to 
the potential negative effects of natural resource wealth (Mulder 2006). 
 Similar to how the Venezuelan economy was historically addicted to oil revenues, 
the Chilean economy demonstrated a history of dependence upon copper rents (Marfán 
and Bosworth 1994). From the 1950s to the 1970s, between 50-60% of total export 
revenues were attributable to copper. Furthermore, even before nationalization, copper 
revenues often accounted for upwards of 10% of GDP (Ffrench-Davis 1974). In another 
similarity to Venezuela, the Chilean dependence on a single export product caused 
economic weakness: Ffrench-Davis (1974) noted that the characteristics of the 
international market for copper prices “constituted the principal cause of instability” for 
Chile’s economy (26). For example, in 1984, the Chilean Treasury Ministry noted that 
“every 1-cent change in the price of copper leads to a $26 million change in income for 
the country,” subjecting public finances to great uncertainty (Ministerio de Hacienda 
1984: 2). 
 While the military regime of Pinochet started initiating neoliberal economic 
reforms in the 1970s, they did not diminish either Chile’s dependence on copper revenues 
or the importance of copper rents for the health of the economy.20 The problems and 
complications resulting from this dependence came to a head in 1982, when “the price of 
copper [had] fallen to its lowest level, in real terms, in the last several decades” 
                                                 
20 Ironically, military funding became dependent on copper revenues during the Pinochet government when 
the 1958 copper law was amended such that the military received 10% of the sales of the state copper 
company, CODELCO.  
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(Ministerio de Hacienda 1984: 2). As a result of the corresponding massive drop in 
government revenue, Chile experienced an acute economic contraction, which many 
blamed directly on the precipitous drop in copper prices (Ministerio de Hacienda 1984; 
Fermandois et al 2009; World Bank 1990). 
 This instability of copper prices, coupled with an acute banking crisis, led 
policymakers to seek out an alternative economic course. While many economic analysts 
had called for greater export diversification in Chile prior to the mid-1980s (see Agosin 
and Bravo Ortega 2007), it was not until the start of the “pragmatic” neoliberal reforms 
enacted during the tenure of Finance Minister Hernan Büchi, that Chile began to 
minimize its dependence on copper revenues by aggressively promoting non-copper 
exports (Silva 1996). Due to the extent of the crisis and the international financial 
conditions at the time, Chile was unable to accomplish a radical reorientation of their 
economy—thereby reducing the prominence of copper rents—without the assistance of 
multilateral financial institutions, most notably the World Bank. In 1985, while Pinochet 
still had more than three years left in his 8-year term granted to him by the 1980 
plebiscite, Chile negotiated a subsequently signed a Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL) 
with the World Bank. One of the conditions of this loan was the creation of a resource 
stabilization fund for copper, which would become the CSF. 
 The main goal of the SAL was to “develop non-copper exports and efficient 
import substitution” (World Bank 1990: xiv). Far from being a simple depository in 
which to store excess copper revenues for a rainy day, the CSF was envisioned to play a 
central role in the development of the non-copper export economy. “An essential feature” 
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of the SAL “would be a Copper Stabilization Fund (CSF) to resist the exchange rate 
appreciation (depreciation) and demand pressures that arise when volatile copper prices 
jump (decline)” (World Bank 1990: 6-7). Not only would the CSF minimize the short-
term problems of copper price fluctuations, but it would also aid medium-to-long-term 
macroeconomic stability. 
 The World Bank (1990) argued that the failure of previous attempts to emerge 
from the deep economic crisis of the early 1980s was due to the exclusive short-term 
focus of the corrective efforts. Alternatively, the 1985 SAL was intended to “instill a 
medium-term dimension and approach in economic policy” with a “permanent emphasis 
on export promotion,” while knowing that “successive short-term policies would have 
doomed the adjustment effort to failure” (World Bank, 1990: ix). In order for the SAL 
and the CSF to be successful, “It was realized that a longer period for adjustment—say 
three to five years—was necessary” (World Bank 1990: 30). Stability and growth were 
the goals, but they were not expected to occur overnight. The implementation of the SAL 
was the culmination of a desire to reorient the economy away from a dependence on 
copper revenues. The Copper Stabilization Fund, which was to be a main pillar of these 
ambitious reforms, was formally created at the end of 1985, just as copper prices started 
an ascent. 
 The creation of the CSF mirrors the conditions for economically-motivated 
reform stipulated above. First of all, it was created when Pinochet still had plenty of time 
left in office before the 1988 plebiscite. The pragmatic neoliberal reforms enacted in the 
mid-1980s were not intended to bear fruit immediately. By enacting the reforms with 
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several years left in his term, Pinochet was putting himself in a position to gain politically 
from the medium-term benefits produced by these policies. Second, the impetus for the 
creation of the CSF and the other complementary economic policies was the result of 
economic challenges as opposed to political ones. Copper prices dropped precipitously in 
the early 1980s to a two-decade low. This price drop led to a very deep recession that 
exposed the need to change the relationship of state finances vis-à-vis copper revenues by 
minimizing dependence on such a volatile source of revenues. Finally, far from being a 
one-off reform, the CSF was part of a battery of reforms intended to minimize Chile’s 
economic dependence on copper by moving to a revenue source that was less prone to 
wild price shocks. 
 It is worth noting that the indicators for politically-motivated institutional creation 
were absent at the time the CSF was created. For example, there was no real threat 
emanating from the opposition; no need to tie anyone’s hands. Even though the 
opposition started becoming slightly more cohesive in the mid-1980s when the CSF was 
created, the opposition still consisted of numerous, disparate factions, with many former 
leftist political elites still living abroad in exile (Silva 1996). Moreover, the reforms did 
not tie the hands of the executive. As we will see below, both the Pinochet regime and the 
successor government, the Concertación, could have changed the rules of the fund by 
decree, without consent from Congress. 
 The CSF started accumulating revenues in 1987, and even more so in 1988 during 
a boom in copper prices. Instead of channeling these revenues through the budget for 
current spending, the Pinochet government used the stored copper revenues to pay down 
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the enormous public debt (Arellano 2005). Furthermore, the CSF revenues were used to 
directly bolster the non-copper export sector in 1989 when the government aided Chilean 
grape exporters hurt by the cyanide scare and the resulting temporarily ban on Chilean 
grape exports to the United States. This period allowed the institution to start developing 
standard operating procedures, thereby helping it become institutionalized before the 
transition to a different government. However, the real test for the strength of the 
institution was whether it would be able to survive after a change in the power structure 
under which the institution was created (Levitsky and Murillo 2009).  
 The historic plebiscite of 1988 denied Pinochet another automatic presidential 
term and led to new elections in 1989, where the center-left coalition, known as the 
Concertación, emerged victorious. After 17 years of repressive military rule, many on the 
left wanted the new Concertación administration to immediately increase social spending 
and enact patronage-oriented policies in order to reverse the years of economic hardship 
that Chile’s poorest citizens had endured under Pinochet’s neoliberal reforms (author 
interviews with Joaquín Vial and José Pablo Arellano). However, Chilean economic 
policymakers saw the problems that neighboring countries had recently faced when 
transitioning to democracy under conditions of economic uncertainty. The experience of 
these neighboring governments, most notably Argentina and Brazil, suggested that 
newly-democratic governments needed economic stability in order to remain politically 
viable. The Concertación economic policymakers thus argued that economic prudence, 
and not an immediate return to high social spending, was the only path toward political 
sustainability: these economic policymakers understood the need to address social issues, 
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but the simultaneous goals of sustained political viability and helping the poor were 
believed to only be achieved through good management of the economy (author 
interviews with Joaquín Vial and José Pablo Arellano). 
One important way that the Concertación was able to maintain their fiscal 
discipline—and benefit politically from their economic prudence—was through the CSF. 
The copper fund was outside the budget, meaning its revenues were “unseen” to those 
who wanted to spend and known only by those who preferred to save (author interview 
with José Pable Arellano). The extra-budgetary position of the CSF greatly minimized 
pressures to spend from those within the coalition and helped economic policymakers 
continue the transition to an economy dominated by non-copper exports that was less 
susceptible to negative shocks in copper prices (author interview with Manuel Marfán). 
Ironically, it was the lack of transparency—the fact that the fund’s revenues were 
largely outside the public’s view—that helped the Chilean economic policymakers 
maintain the CSF’s viability. Had CSF revenues been included directly in the budget, it 
would have been much more difficult for the Concertación to maintain its economic 
prudence with respect to how it managed copper revenues (author interview with Manuel 
Marfán). Furthermore, there were not regular reports on the transfers to and from the 
stabilization fund. This stands in stark contrast to the arguments by Davis et al. (2001), 
who argue that transparency is a necessary condition for successful stabilization funds. 
Moreover, the Concertación administrations could have altered the rules of the 
stabilization fund at their discretion and without the approval of Congress; that is, had 
they wanted, they could have given themselves greater access to the fund’s revenues. The 
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lack of transparency combined with the weak nature of the CSF’s rules suggests that 
formal characteristics of institutions are less important for institutional success than a 
desire to comply. 
Had the Concertación not inherited this already-functioning institution, it would 
have been very difficult to “hide” copper revenues in order to reduce pressures to spend 
and maintain economic prudence in order to enhance their political standing. The Budget 
Director during the first Concertación administration, José Pablo Arellano, noted that the 
Concertación actually enhanced the functioning of the CSF compared to the Pinochet 
years (author interview with José Pablo Arellano). The coalition worked through, and 
indeed strengthened, the institution created by its predecessor in order to achieve its own 
economic—and political—goals. 
 In short, upon assuming the presidency after 17 years of dictatorship, the 
Concertación faced many competing priorities. The coalition faced pressures to spend, 
they had money stored in the CSF ready to spend, and they had the discretion to change 
the CSF rules if they had wanted to spend. Yet the Concertación’s goals required that the 
coalition maintain its political standing. Understanding that its future electability was 
tightly linked to its ability to manage the economy well, the Concertación was able to use 
the CSF to minimize spending pressures and to maintain macroeconomic stability. Thus, 
the CSF helped the Concertación lengthen its time horizons and achieve their political 
goals by providing them the opportunity to gain greater continuous benefits across the 
medium and long term than the short term benefits that would have been gained by using 
the copper revenues for current spending. 
 
38
 The upshot of the Concertación being able to minimize pressures to immediately 
spend copper revenues had important impacts for the rest of the economy and for the 
economic platform started by the SAL. While the Pinochet regime did enact laws that 
made the country more appealing to international investors, it was not until the 
Concertación came into office that Chile experienced a boom in FDI. The desire to send 
positive economic signals to potential investors was a priority for the Concertación 
(author interviews with Joaquín Vial and Manuel Marfán). The success of these signals to 
investors—and the subsequent ability to sustain this investment—were contingent upon 
maintaining macroeconomic stability, which was one of the main purposes of the CSF. 
The success of these efforts are evident: FDI to Chile increased dramatically during the 
Concertación’s watch, expanding almost fourfold to record levels—from US $2.7 billion 
to 9.8 billion—between 1993 and 1999 (O’Brien 2002; Ffrench-Davis 2002).  
 Another benefit of the CSF, which its creators intended, was that it helped keep 
the exchange rate stable, increasing the viability of the non-copper exports. As suggested 
above, one problem that natural resource-rich countries face is that wanton spending of 
unpredictable rents often begets wild fluctuations of the exchange rate. During booms, 
the exchange rate has the tendency to appreciate, making the products of non-resource 
exporters more expensive abroad, often hurting the profitability of this sector and further 
concentrating investment in the natural resource sector. By virtue of the Concertación’s 
ability to abstain from using copper revenues for current spending, non-copper exporters 
were able to enjoy the macroeconomic stability provided by the CSF. Even though 
copper exports expanded rapidly during the Concertación’s first decade in power, non-
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copper exports grew even more quickly, eclipsing copper rents as the country’s main 
source of export revenues (Ffrench-Davis 2002). 
 The CSF has helped to minimize the country’s dependence on copper rents and 
has provided a platform to expand non-copper exports, leading to the rise of new 
domestic and international economic actors who benefit from the current system. The 
logic of collective action (Olson 1982) would suggest that the increase in the number and 
power of the non-governmental stakeholders in Chile’s new non-copper dominated 
economic model would make it more difficult for the Concertación to jeopardize 
macroeconomic stability by raiding the CSF in order to spend a greater proportion of its 
copper revenues. Yet, as explained above, it is not only external pressure that is causing 
the Concertación to adhere to the CSF: the political benefits enjoyed by the coalition 
ensure internal compliance with the institution. 
The evidence presented above suggests that the conditions under which the CSF 
was created, and specifically that it was created for economic purposes, made the 
institution successful in constraining the Concertación from spending copper revenues for 
short-term political purposes. The upshot of the Concertación’s prudent management of 
the CSF is that the country is less economically volatile and is much less prone to the 
negative effects of the resource curse than before (Perry 2007; Marfán and Bosworth 
1994; Mulder 2006; Larraín and Parro 2008). 
Conclusion 
 The findings of this Master’s Report have several implications for current 
research in comparative politics. First, while political insurance arguments have an 
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important role to play in the explanations of institutional creation, they are subject to 
caution on two fronts. First of all, there needs to be a greater clarity of the conditions 
under which political insurance occurs. More precise variables are required in order to 
truly differentiate instances of political insurance from other reasons for institutional 
creation. This manuscript has identified certain conditions that should accompany both 
politically- and economically-motivated institutional reforms. However, more work 
should be done to develop definitive measures of important variables, such as executive 
weakness and the strength of the opposition.  
A second problem with political insurance arguments is their bias toward 
institutional success. Political insurance arguments often take for granted that institutions 
created under precarious conditions will succeed and tie the hands of successors. I have 
argued that the conditions under which political insurance occurs sets the stage for the 
failure of these institutions. Reconciling the performance of institutions with the 
conditions under which they are created will be a difficult task for the next wave of 
researchers applying political insurance arguments. 
 This Report also adds an important dimension to the literature on the natural 
resource curse. The evidence in this article corroborates the recent wave of resource curse 
literature suggesting that natural resources are a contingent curse, and can occasionally be 
a blessing. However, it also suggests that formal institutions have less of a role to play in 
“curing” the resource curse than the current literature suggests. While a formal 
institution—the resource stabilization fund—helped Chile minimize its dependence on 
copper rents, Venezuela was not as lucky. However, the success of the formal institution 
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in Chile (and the failure of the formal institution in Venezuela) had less to do with the 
institution itself, and more to do with the conditions under which the institution was 
created. Thus, it is possible that the formal institutions themselves are epiphenomenal to 
other variables, requiring researchers in the resource curse tradition to dig deeper to find 
the true causes of variation among natural resource-rich countries. 
Finally, this manuscript speaks to the problems of attributing institutional success 
to formal institutions. The resource stabilization fund law in Venezuela was initially 
much stronger and much more explicit than that of Chile. The Concertación in Chile 
could have changed the rules of the copper stabilization fund at any time without 
congressional approval. Despite a strong institution in Venezuela and a weak institution 
in Chile, the RSF was broken in Venezuela but remained intact in Chile. Considering that 
the experience with the resource stabilization fund was much more favorable in Chile 
than Venezuela, the formal design of the institution proved a poor predictor of 
institutional success. Researchers should thus heed the advice of Levitsky and Murillo 
(2009) by focusing less on the formal structure of institutions and more on variables that 
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